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The theoretical bases of academic service learning are examined, with
particular attention to John Dewey’s contributions. The service
learning movement is conceptualized as part of an ongoing—and still
unsuccessful—effort to “de-Platonize” and democratize American
higher education in particular and American schooling in general.
De-Platonizing and Democratizing
Education as the Bases of Service
Learning
Ira Harkavy, Lee Benson
Academic service learning is a pedagogy derived from a theory of democratic
education and schooling developed by John Dewey to replace Plato’s aristo-
cratic theory of education and society. At minimum, Dewey’s theory assert s
four propositions:
1. “Reflective thought is an active response to the challenge of the environ-
ment” (Smith, 1983, p. 124).
2. Individuals learn best when they participate “in the formation of the pur-
poses that govern their activities” (Nicholls and Hazzard, 1995, p. 114).
3. All individuals can contribute to knowledge.
4. The fundamental purpose of knowledge is to improve human welfare.
Although Dewey did not originate all four propositions, he developed a the-
o ry of instrumental intelligence and democratic education that significantly
advanced and integrated them. It can fairly be said: In the beginning there was
D e w e y. Dewey’s work, however, is not the sole source of current practice and the-
o ry. Important predecessors, related but generally independent thinkers and doers,
and latter-day Deweyans have also contributed to academic service learn i n g .
To overestimate the impact of Platonic thought on We s t e rn philosophy
would be nearly impossible. A proposition asserted by A. N. Whitehead 
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succinctly captures Plato’s preeminent influence: “The whole later development
of We s t e rn philosophy can be re g a rded as a series of extended footnotes to Plato”
( M a rgetson, 1994, p. 7). Uncompromisingly aristocratic and antidemocratic, Pla-
tonic thought has had perhaps its greatest (and most pernicious) impact on We s t-
e rn education.
For Plato, learning occurred through contemplative thought, not thro u g h
action and reflection. Dividing the world into ideal and material universes, Plato
viewed knowledge as deriving from the ideal, spiritual universe of perm a n e n t
and fixed ideas. He conceptualized the material world of objects and actions as
m e rely “a shadowy, fleeting world” of imperfect imitations (Butts, 1955, p. 46).
Just as ideas were fixed and permanent for Plato, so too were society’s
classes and their characteristics. Knowledge could not be attained by the vast
mass of people who did society’s basic work; and the warrior class could attain
only imperfect knowledge since its members’ thoughts were tied to the mate-
rial world. True knowledge was the province of the ruling class, those few men
capable of going beyond the sensate and material world to the eternal world
of ideas. Plato designed an educational system that would sort people into one
of the three classes, with major attention and re s o u rces provided to those des-
tined to become philosopher-kings. Fixed truths, rigid classes, and advanced
education for the few are concepts that fit well with the antidemocratic, aris-
tocratic form of society that Plato advocated to overcome the “evils” of Athen-
ian “democracy.”
Academic service learning can be conceptualized as an attempt to re l e a s e
the vice-like grip that the dead hand of Plato has had, and continues to have,
on American schooling and education. Although anti-Platonic precursors of ser-
vice learning can be found as early as Cicero in the first century B.C. , F r a n c i s
Bacon provides a more useful starting point for our discussion (Sullivan, 1996,
pp. 17–18).
Francis Bacon and the Production and 
Use of Knowledge
B a c o n ’s work contributed powerfully to the seventeenth-century Scientific Rev-
olution and the idea of pro g ress it helped to inspire. He promoted the idea that
replacing ancient scholastic science with a modern experimental science of
i n q u i ry and effective organization for collaborative work would greatly advance
knowledge for “the relief of man’s estate,” that is, continual human betterm e n t
(as quoted in Benson, 1978, p. 429).
Dewey praised Bacon as “the great fore runner of the spirit of modern life,”
the “prophet of new tendencies,” and the “real founder of modern thought”
(1948 [1920], pp. 28–32). In Dewey’s view, Bacon’s far- reaching pro p o s i t i o n
that knowledge is power provided the pragmatic criterion needed to test,
assess, and demonstrate the relative effectiveness of traditional (Platonic) and
modern modes of inquiry.
For Bacon, pro g ress is dependent upon both the production and use of
knowledge. If production were isolated or separated from use, the re s u l t s
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would not be beneficial. For knowledge to function as power for good, effec-
tive organization must dynamically and systematically plan for the integrated
p roduction and use of knowledge. Undertaken for the wrong (amoral or
immoral) reasons, the production of new knowledge, more o v e r, could have
d readful consequences. Knowledge, Bacon contended, should be pursued “for
the benefit and the use of life,” not “for pleasure of the mind, or for contention,
or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of those
inferior things” (as quoted in Farrington, 1949, pp. 88–89).
B a c o n ’s challenge to Platonic thought included a rejection of the ancient
G reek aristocratic false dualism between “superior” pure theory and “inferior”
applied practice. As Benjamin Farrington has emphasized: “Bacon insisted again
and again on the virtual identity of scientific truth and practical utility. What is
most useful in practice is most correct in theory. . . . The improvement of man’s
mind and the improvement of his lot are one and the same thing’”(1949, p. 98).
B a c o n ’s promotion of pro g ress as the standard to judge inquiry, his
emphasis on both the production and humane use of knowledge, and his link-
age of practice and theory all constituted “a sustained attack on traditional phi-
losophy” (Box, 1989, pp. 2–3). That attack also included a part i c i p a t o ry
democratic conception of the organization and conduct of scientific inquiry,
one radically at odds with Plato’s elitist, antidemocratic theory and plan. For
Bacon, (almost) all human beings continuously have to try to solve problems
a ffecting their well-being. If the mass of human beings were educated, there-
f o re, to engage in their real-world problem-solving in the spirit of, and with
the methods of, modern experimental scientific inquiry, and if scientific inquiry
w e re appropriately org a n i z e d , then the results of their daily pro b l e m - s o l v i n g
could contribute measurably to “new facts and new truths.” Or, as Ian Box
emphasized in his Social Thought of Francis Bacon: “The project did not depend
on the unique genius of a Plato or an Aristotle, but was open to every man’s
i n d u s t ry. E v e ryone could contribute to the p ro g ressive interpretation of nature
[emphasis added]” (1989, pp. 2–3; Benson and Harkavy, 1994, pp. 68–69).
Bacon strongly argued that the effective organization of inquiry was nec-
e s s a ry if knowledge was to be produced and used for humane ends. In his
Utopian fable, The New Atlantis (1627), Bacon sketched a comprehensive org a-
nizational system for the increasingly pro g ressive, integrated production and
use of knowledge. Bacon’s vision of the appropriate organization of re s e a rc h
was so radical and comprehensive that, even today, it remains far from re a l-
ization. It would be an eighteenth-century disciple of Bacon, Benjamin
Franklin, who would propose creating a college devoted to public service. In
so doing, Franklin identified an institutional vehicle capable of putting Bacon’s
noble vision into practice.
Franklin’s Contribution: Service and the Reformation 
of Higher Education
Contemptuous of scholasticism and devoted to Bacon’s modern experimental
p h i l o s o p h y, Franklin acted on the proposition that effective organization was
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m a n d a t o ry if knowledge was to function as power and help achieve the “re l i e f
of man’s estate.” In 1743, Franklin proposed the establishment of two Bacon-
i n s p i red organizational innovations in Philadelphia. One eventually became
the present-day American Philosophical Society for Promoting Useful Knowl-
edge, the other, the University of Pennsylvania.
Franklin’s ideas focused on a course of study that would include English
grammar and composition, public speaking, history, geography, mathematics
and accounting, natural history, scientific experiments, and ethics. Most cen-
t r a l l y, the curriculum would be infused with public service; it would be an edu-
cation for citizenship and service. The college would be an institution of higher
education to train an elite, teach them useful knowledge, and develop their
capacity to learn and to produce useful knowledge. Above all, however, it
would inculcate the Baconian ideal of acquiring and pursuing knowledge for
the “benefit and use of life.”
F r a n k l i n ’s ideas were never adopted at the University of Pennsylvania. To
some extent, however, during the 1890s, Seth Low, president of Columbia Uni-
v e r s i t y, put them into practice by consciously intertwining Columbia with New
York City; and John Dewey at the University of Chicago developed a theory of
i n s t rumental intelligence that served as the philosophical basis of academic
service learning.
Seth Low’s Columbia as a Cosmopolitan, Democratic,
Civic University
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Columbia, like other
leading urban universities—for example, Johns Hopkins, the University of
Pennsylvania, and the University of Chicago—seized the opportunity to
advance knowledge, teaching, and learning by working to improve the qual-
ity of life in American cities experiencing the traumatic effects of industrial-
ization, immigration, and large-scale urbanization (Benson and Harkavy,
1997a; Harkavy, 1996). Seth Low, Columbia’s president from 1890 thro u g h
1901, is notable for his enthusiastic embrace of New York City as the sourc e
of the university’s greatness. He not only brought “the College into closer
touch with the community,” but he also significantly improved Columbia by
successfully encouraging faculty and students to focus their intellectual work
on helping New York solve its problems (Low as quoted in Kurland, 1971,
p. 53).
A mediocre institution in the 1870s and 1880s, Columbia was widely
viewed as a snobbish school for rich young men. In his inaugural address, Low
echoed Bacon’s and Franklin’s proposition that the purpose of scholarship is
s e rvice for the betterment of humanity, and actually went beyond by posing
and answering the question, “Knowledge for what?” He called on students and
p rofessors to become engaged directly with the city and its communities and
people. Engagement with, and study and action in New York City, accord i n g
to Low, would produce liberally educated and moral students, as well as
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“ w o r l d l y,” “unpedantic” professors inspired and equipped to contribute pro-
foundly to the advancement of knowledge (Cary, 1897, pp. 10, 40–41).
No other university president had so clearly articulated a morally inspire d ,
i n s t rumental, active approach to re s e a rch, teaching, and learning. In eff e c t ,
repudiating Plato’s notion of the groves of academe with its physical and intel-
lectual separation of town and gown, Low linked town and gown, identifying
a mutually beneficial, interactive relationship between Columbia and the city
as crucial to intellectual and institutional advancement. Low even went so far
as to invoke Bacon’s standard of pro g ress as the test of inquiry and re s e a rch. In
L o w ’s case, the specific test was Columbia’s ability “to influence the life of New
York” (Bender, 1987, p. 284). That influence would not result, more o v e r, fro m
the authoritative, elitist, university-dominated approach advocated by many of
the most “pro g ressive” Pro g ressive-era academics. To the contrary, Low’s
a p p roach was decidedly democratic in dealing with the city and its people.
L e a rning would be, he emphasized, re c i p rocal and interactive: “Wo r k i n g m e n
of America . . . [should know] that at Columbia College . . . the disposition
exists to teach the truth . . . without fear or favor, and we ask their aid to enable
us to see the truth as it appears to them [emphasis added]” (Bender, 1987, p. 283).
L o w ’s extraord i n a ry contributions to Columbia and to the practice and
t h e o ry of instrumental education have largely been forgotten. His vision of a
cosmopolitan, democratic, civic university was significantly ahead of its time.
M o re o v e r, the brevity of his tenure, the fort y - t h ree year imperious reign of his
successor (Nicholas Murray Butler), and the dominance of Plato’s aristocratic,
scholastic, “liberal” educational theory in American colleges and universities
also account for Low’s limited impact. In recent years, increasing critiques of
the perf o rmance of internally directed, solipsistic ivory towers and the con-
comitant call for higher education to help solve the serious problems con-
f ronting American society have led to a nascent interest in Columbia during
the Low years. These same factors have contributed to the “Dewey re v i v a l ”
a ffecting scholarship across many disciplines, simultaneously shaping educa-
tional practice through academic service learning and related pedagogies.
Dewey’s Theory of Instrumental Intelligence and
Democratic Instrumental Education
Though he never wrote directly about service learning, Dewey’s contributions
to academic service learning are so varied and rich that it is a subject wort h y
of many books. Summarized succinctly, Dewey developed a theory of instru-
mental intelligence and democratic instrumental education that provides the
underpinnings for the growing democratic “crusade” against Plato’s aristocratic,
idealist, contemplative philosophy. Dewey explicitly conceptualized his work
as a critique of the philosophy and methods of the “Old Education,” when
“ l e a rning was a class matter,” and “a high priesthood of learning . . . guard e d
the truth and . . . doled it out to the masses under severe restrictions” (1990
[1900], pp. 24–26). Existing American schools, as Dewey viewed them, were
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l a rgely derived from and dominated by those antiquated, highly dysfunctional,
aristocratic, monastic models. In 1899 he wrote: “The ideals of this period are
still largely in control, even where the outward methods and studies have
changed . . . our present education . . . is . . . dominated almost entirely by the
medieval conception of learning” (1990 [1900], pp. 24–26).
D e w e y ’s critique of the “almost entirely . . . medieval” American public
school system had two interrelated dimensions: the system was radically dys-
functional for industrially advanced American society; it was radically anti-
thetical to American democratic ideals. For Dewey, if there were no democratic
education and schooling system, there could be no genuinely democratic soci-
e t y. An aristocratic, idealist, scholastic Greek “liberal” theory of education was
a p p ropriate for and supportive of an aristocratic social order—but highly inap-
propriate for a democratic social order. Dewey further argued that traditional
schooling created “passivity of attitude,” with devastating effects on a child’s
ability to learn, to develop his or her own talents, and to become an active,
participatory citizen (1990 [1900], pp. 31–34).
D e w e y ’s theory of democratic or “New Education” emphasized that stu-
dents should be able to help shape their own learning, help form their cur-
riculum, and reflect on its value. Democracy and learning, for Dewey, would
both be advanced if human beings were engaged in active real-world pro b l e m -
solving that entailed ongoing “intelligent judgment and action” (as quoted in
Westbrook, 1991, p. xv). In 1938, Dewey emphatically asserted that “there is
. . . no point in the philosophy of pro g ressive education which is sounder than
the emphasis upon the importance of the participation of the learner in the
f o rmation of the purpose which directs his activities in the learning pro c e s s ”
(Nicholls and Hazzard, 1995, p. 115).
At the heart of Dewey’s approach is a theory of instrumental intelligence
that rejects Platonic dualisms that counterpose practice and theory, material
and ideal, and so on. To quote Donald Schön: “In the domain of practice, we
see what John Dewey called inquiry: thought intertwined with action—which
p roceeds from doubt to the resolution of doubt, to the generation of new
doubt. For Dewey, doubt lies not in the mind but in the situation. Inquiry
begins with situations that are problematic—that are confusing, uncertain, or
conflicted, and block the free flow of action” (1995, p. 31). Put another way,
genuine learning, according to Dewey, only occurs when human beings focus
their attention, energies, and abilities on solving genuine dilemmas and per-
plexities—and when they reflect on their experience and, there f o re, incre a s e
their capacity for future intelligent thought and action. Intelligence does not
develop simply as a result of action and experience, it develops as a result of
reflective action and experience (Benson and Harkavy, 1997b).
If we use the Baconian test of pro g ress both in society and scholarship,
we find that Dewey’s work has had a mixed result. Dewey’s Laboratory School
at the University of Chicago, the primary means for putting his ideas into prac-
tice, certainly did not revolutionize the American public school system. It did,
h o w e v e r, serve as the most important vehicle for disseminating the ideas of the
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University of Chicago’s philosophy department. The work of the depart m e n t
p roduced an extraord i n a ry achievement—the development of Chicago Prag-
matism. Hailed by William James as so “wonderful . . . [that] it deserves the
title of a new system of philosophy,” the Chicago School emerged from the
action-oriented engagement of Dewey and his colleagues in the re a l - w o r l d
p roblems of the city in which they lived and worked (Rucker, 1969, pp. 3–4).
Indeed, from the University of Chicago’s founding in 1892 through and
beyond Dewey’s depart u re to Columbia in 1904, the city’s re f o rm movement
was closely tied to the university. Dewey, James H. Tufts, and George Herbert
Mead, for example, all played leading roles in the eff o rts to improve education
and politics in the city (Shils, 1988). According to a leading authority on the
Chicago Pragmatists, more o v e r, these “practical endeavors were encouraged as
fitting for a university providing a broad field of testing ideas and theories”
(Rucker, 1969, p. 9).
T h e re are obviously striking parallels between Low’s Columbia and
D e w e y ’s Chicago. The city, with its problems and rich opportunities, served in
both cases as the focal point and wellspring of action, learning, and scholar-
ship. In both cases, a real-world, action-oriented academic strategy produced
significant institutional and intellectual advances.
In 1927, many years after he had left Chicago, Dewey unequivocally iden-
tified the existence of “neighborly community” as indispensable for a well-
functioning democratic society: “There is no substitute for the vitality and
depth of close and direct intercourse and attachment. . . . Democracy begins
at home, and its home is the neighborly community.” In that same book, The
Public and Its Pro b l e m s , he also noted that creating a genuinely democratic com-
munity is “in the first instance an intellectual problem” (pp. 213, 147).
Dewey in effect identified the central societal problem (and there f o re cen-
tral intellectual problem) of human societies in the twentieth century to be
the actual construction of what we have termed “cosmopolitan neighborly
communities.” The discussion of community in The Public and Its Pro b l e m s ,
along with the extraord i n a ry success achieved by “pro g ressive academics” at
Chicago and Columbia (and other urban universities) at the turn of the twen-
tieth century, provide a powerful case for a community problem-solving focus
for college and university re s e a rch, teaching, and service. Thus, strategic, aca-
demically based community scholarship and service—a particularly signifi-
cant variant of academically based service learning—can also be traced to
D e w e y ’s seminal activities and writings. Strategic, academically based com-
munity scholarship and service involves the integration of re s e a rch, teaching,
and service, and aims to bring about structural community improvement (for
example, effective public schools, neighborhood economic development,
s t rong community organizations) rather than simply to alleviate individual
m i s e ry (for example, feeding the hungry, sheltering the homeless, tutoring the
“slow learner”). It has as its primary goal contributing to the well-being of
people in the community, both in the here and now and in the future
( H a r k a v y, 1996; Lawson, 1997).
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Notwithstanding Dewey’s far- reaching contribution to current practice and
t h e o ry, he never systematically explored how to get from a Plato-inspired, aris-
tocratic, idealist schooling system to a system of democratic instrumental edu-
cation. Dewey’s writings, however, do contain a wide variety of fruitful general
ideas, insights, and propositions that, when appropriately applied in practice,
can be used to put the “New Education” into practice. Dewey’s work, for exam-
ple, adumbrates the method of part i c i p a t o ry action re s e a rch, which has played
an increasingly significant role in academic service learning. It was the emi-
nent social psychologist, Kurt Lewin, however, who labeled and operational-
ized the approach.
Kurt Lewin and Action Research
A true heir of Bacon, Lewin held that “re s e a rch that produces nothing but
books will not suffice” (as quoted in Tu rn e r, 1986, p. 201). His most well-
known aphorism, “there is nothing so practical as a good theory,” is a clear
rejection of Platonic dualism and a call for connecting scholarship and the re a l
world (Lewin, 1964, p. 169; Marro w, 1969). Lewin worked toward the devel-
opment of “actionable theory”; that is, theory constructed, applied, tested, and
revised in “particular situations of practice” (Schön, 1995, p. 31).
L e w i n ’s commitment to action re s e a rch in service to a better society is evi-
dent in the connection he made between the Research Center for Gro u p
Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which he created and
d i rected, and the American Jewish Congre s s ’s Commission on Community
I n t e rrelations (CCI). The CCI conducted action re s e a rch on community aff a i r s ,
focusing on minority problems, ethnocultural conflict, and discriminatory atti-
tudes and behavior. Lewin’s work with the Commission strongly resonates with
D e w e y ’s theory of instrumental intelligence while providing a re s e a rch strat-
egy that embeds and integrates both action and reflection (Harkavy and Puck-
ett, 1997).
In effect, Lewin developed a method to help extend and realize Dewey’s
philosophy and theories. David Kolb’s work on experiential education (1984)
and Donald Schön’s study of the professions and the “reflective practitioner”
(1983) both discuss the similarities between the work of Dewey and Lewin.
Indeed, Kolb and Schön are two important contributors to the practice of aca-
demic service learning. Their writings, as well as those of Ernest Boyer (1994),
have helped in diff e rent ways to bring the ideas of Bacon, Franklin, Low,
Dewey, and Lewin into current discussion and use.
Conclusion
We conclude with Dewey’s brilliant observation that “the true starting point of
h i s t o ry is always some present situation with its problems” (1916, p. 251). The
p resent situation informing this essay is the increasing development of academic
s e rvice learning in colleges and universities haunted by the “living ghost” of
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Plato—a living ghost that functions as an incubus on the body of the entire
American system of schooling. The core problem embedded in that situation is:
How can academic service learning, particularly academically based commu-
nity scholarship and service, help overt h row the aristocratic Platonic theory of
“liberal education” and institute a democratic Deweyan theory of “instru m e n-
tal education?” The history sketched above aims to help service learners and
practitioners/theorists better use and understand the work of their pre d e c e s s o r s
so that they (we) might speed the radical, long overdue, “de-Platonization” of
American higher education in particular and American schooling in general.
“ O v e rt h rowing Plato and instituting Dewey” should constitute the cate-
gorical imperative—the re v o l u t i o n a ry slogan—of the service learning move-
ment in the twenty-first century.
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